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A BRIEF CRITIQUE OF THE EMACIATED STATE




These Americans are the most peculiar people in the world. You’ll not
believe me when I tell you how they behave. In a local community in their
country a citizen may conceive of some need which is not being met.
What does he do? He goes across the street, discusses it with his neighbor.
And then what happens?  A committee comes into existence.  And the
committee begins functioning in behalf of the need.1
INTRODUCTION
When, in January 2006, seven-year-old Nixzmary Brown was
tortured and beaten to death, allegedly by her stepfather as her
mother ignored her cries for help, every New Yorker looked at the
city’s Administration for Children’s Services for answers.2  Con-
versely, I do not recall any discussion about the failure of charities
to adequately provide for the city’s abused children.  Charities, like
non-governmental organizations (NGOs), are not expected to be
responsible for systemic problems.3  They are a moral and social
bonus,4 which fill the gap in discrete areas where taxpayers’ money
is not sufficient.5
* Head of Public Services, Arthur W. Diamond Law Library, Columbia University;
Adjunct Professor, Barnard College.  Without Sanja Zgonjanin’s gentle push, this Arti-
cle would have never been written.  Thanks, Sanja.
1 Ronald Reagan, President of the United States, Remarks at the Presentation
Ceremony for the President’s Volunteer Action Awards (May 7, 1984) (quoting
ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (J.P. Mayer ed., George Lawrence
trans., Harper Perennial Modern Classics 2006) (1835)), available at http://
www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1984/50784e.htm.
2 Nicole Gelinas, After Nixzmary Brown, N.Y. SUN, Jan. 20–22, 2006, at 1.
3 Karla W. Simon & Saine Watson, Not-For-Profit and Non-Governmental Organiza-
tions, 39 INT’L LAW. 639, 639 (2005) (“The tsunami disaster at the end of 2004 illus-
trated the importance of NGOs, the services they provide, and their capabilities when
processes are streamlined and they are incorporated into nations working together.”).
4 Philanthropy is a welcome activity by both the donors and the donees. See, e.g.,
CARL BAKAL, CHARITY U.S.A.: AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE HIDDEN WORLD OF THE
MULTI-BILLION DOLLAR CHARITY INDUSTRY 33–49 (1979).
5 For example, see the New York Times Company Foundation and its programs,
such as the New York Times College Scholarship Program.  New York Times Company
Foundation, http://www.nytco.com/company/foundation (last visited Mar. 8, 2006)
(“Working with Times writers and editors as jurors, the Foundation each year selects
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So I may be accused of having a one-track mind, but I cannot
seem to escape the following questions: Why do we even talk about
providing social services in the twenty-first century?  Couldn’t we
have had this issue resolved by now?  Why don’t we have a “sophisti-
cated national system of government departments”6 charged with
this task?  Most other Western countries have one.7  Even corporate
America would like the government to be in charge of providing
social services for its employees.8
Instead we find ourselves on the cutting-edge of a newly fash-
ionable neo-liberal government that looks as emaciated as a
Hollywood diva and as masculine as a New York City cop.  This
decade-long transformation comes hand-in-hand with a trend of
privatization and an increased reliance on the nonprofit sector,
both domestically and internationally.
Charities and NGOs are in vogue.  They have come to promi-
nence as class-based politics have been replaced by human rights
discourse and as radical discourse has abandoned large social
projects in favor of incremental discrete social goals.9  However,
we are still plagued by systemic problems—such as poverty and an
increasing gap between the haves and the have-nots10—which need
systemic solutions.  To the extent that we recognize these problems
and the need for large social projects, we have delegated them to
the private sector or to the police force, which is expected to offer
both increased personal security to the haves and social services to
the disenfranchised.11  As a result, we are creating an imminent
crisis: Our expectation that private charities should take care of
20 Times Scholars, students who have overcome exceptional hardship to achieve ex-
cellence in New York City public high schools.  Each student receives a four-year col-
lege scholarship, mentoring and summer employment.”).
6 KERRY O’HALLORAN, CHARITY LAW 111 (2000).
7 Even smaller countries like Ireland have a government charged with providing
poverty relief services.  Id.
8 See generally Clifford J. Levy, The New Corporate Outsourcing, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29,
2006, § 4, at 1.
9 See generally Dana Neaçsu, The Wrongful Rejection of Big Theory (Marxism) by Femi-
nism and Queer Theory: A Brief Debate, 34 CAP. U. L. REV. 125 (2005) [hereinafter
Neaçsu, The Wrongful Rejection].
10 See e.g., Richard N. Goodwin, The Class Struggle Is Over—The Wealthy Win, L.A.
TIMES, July 15, 1996, at B5; Scott Finn, Gap Between Rich, Poor Widening: Poor Families
Are Poorest in Mountain State, Study Says, CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Feb. 7, 2006, at 1C;
Wendy Cole, Rich Ohio but Poor Ohioans, TIME, Jan. 30, 2006, at 14.
11 Malcolm Gladwell, Million-Dollar Murray: Why Problems Like Homelessness May Be
Easier to Solve than Manage, NEW YORKER, Feb. 13 & 20, 2006, at 96–97, available at
http://www.newyorker.com/fact/content/articles/060213fa_fact (“‘It cost us one
million dollars not to do something about [homeless ex-marine] Murray [Barr],’ said
Officer Patrick O’Bryan of the Reno Police Department.”).
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our social services is ludicrous because the private sector—to the
extent it wants to in the first place—is ill-equipped to solve such
problems.  Furthermore, such blind reliance can only hurt
America’s democratic social makeup.
Part I of this Article will expose the current denigration of so-
cial liberalism while attempting to briefly explain its origins, its ma-
jor by-product—the welfare state—and the result of its failure: the
rise of the neo-liberal state and its reliance on charities.  Next, as-
suming theories greatly impact social constructs, Part II will con-
nect the presence of the neo-liberal state to a lack of classical class-
based radicalism.  Today, we witness a hegemonic discourse which
legitimizes the neo-liberal state and a radical discourse which shyly
critiques some of its effects while leaving its legitimacy unques-
tioned.  Finally, Part III will argue in favor of a reconsideration of
the role we retain for the state and that which we relegate to chari-
ties regarding social services.
I. CHARITIES AND THE WELFARE STATE
This Section begins with our society’s increased reliance on
privatizing previously government-provided social services by the
neo-liberal state.  As the neo-liberal state loses interest in support-
ing distributive justice, social services survive only as an undesired
component of corrective justice or to the extent charities are will-
ing to pay for them.  This Section also notes that, under this new
configuration, social and gender minorities are most affected as
they are left outside the shrinking benefits provided by public
assistance.
A. On Charities
The term “charity” derives from the Latin word caritas, mean-
ing dearness, affection.  The Oxford English Dictionary defines char-
ity as “Christian love,” but ordinarily we view charities as a form of
private philanthropy.  Legally, a charity is a “nonprofit trust, corpo-
ration or unincorporated association operated for the benefit of
indefinite persons and devoted to purposes beneficial to the
community.”12
Charities are not a new socio-economic creation.  Looking at
their history, one may suggest that their existence is connected to
the social division between the economically prosperous and the
poor.  Economic prosperity allows one to become generous and
12 EDITH FISCH ET AL., CHARITIES AND CHARITABLE FOUNDATIONS 1 (1974).
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provide for certain causes of potential public interest or, at times,
even take care of (some of) the poor.13
Charities have a long history.  Some scholars connect them
with the Egyptian pharaohs,14 when charities functioned as a way of
promoting care for the pharaoh’s tomb.  Charities then further de-
veloped in the pagan Greek and Roman empire, when they were
established for the benefit of the entire community.15  Later, in the
Christian Roman empire, they followed the Judeo-Christian tradi-
tion of relief to “the poor and the unfortunate.”16  In the Middle
Ages, however, the Christian tradition of charity changed, and the
relief of the poor ceased to be an end in and of itself and became
instead a means to save a soul (in the Augustinian sense, of expiat-
ing a sin).17
In England, Christian charities have a long history, too.  Very
early on, however, ecclesiastical charities encountered functional
problems.  As a result, in 1601 the Elizabethan Statute of Relief of
the Poor was passed.18  Although the Elizabethan Statute was sup-
posed to cure the inadequacy of private philanthropy by creating
the foundation of the British system of state-sponsored social ser-
vices,19 private charities have continued to co-exist in Britain.
In the United States, charities had a late start in the social ser-
vices area because, while destitution was widespread in the Old
World, colonial America offered substantial sources of livelihood.20
Furthermore, charities have often been funded by a mixture of
both private and public money.21  Even “Harvard College was
founded in 1636 by a bequest from John Harvard and a credit from
the General Court, and was sustained by both private benefactions
and public grants.”22
In the next two centuries, private charities received increased
judicial support—often in terms of a reluctance to change the
charitable scheme of the donor, as Chief Justice Marshall notes in
Dartmouth College v. Woodward—mirroring our national theme of a
rugged individualism.23  However, Roscoe Pound denounced this
13 DAVID WAGNER, WHAT’S LOVE GOT TO DO WITH IT? 94–97 (2000).
14 FISCH, supra note 12, at 8.
15 Id. at 9.
16 Id.
17 Id. at 15.
18 Id. at 17.
19 Id. at 18.
20 WALTER I. TRATTNER, FROM POOR LAW TO WELFARE STATE 12 (3d ed. 1984).
21 BAKAL, supra note 4, at 225.
22 FISCH, supra note 12, at 20.
23 Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 647 (1819).
2006] A BRIEF CRITIQUE OF THE EMACIATED STATE 409
trend because there was a new need for a “more even balance be-
tween individualism and collectivism”24 as times changed and new
ideas about wealth as a public trust emerged.25
To a certain extent, the nonprofit sector and charitable organ-
izations overlap.  The nonprofit sector in the United States is de-
fined negatively as the sector that is neither the business (“for-
profit”) nor the governmental sector.26   The term “nonprofit” it-
self is misleading because the nonprofit organization, like a for-
profit one, does make a profit.  Certainly, their employees are
among the direct beneficiaries of this private sector.27  Moreover,
unlike the business sector, the nonprofit sector is tax-exempt.  A
charitable bequest qualifies for federal tax deductions,28 which
benefits the donor and his chosen social “purpose,”29 but penalizes
society at large by reducing the amount of collectible taxes.
Charitable organizations, as a segment of the nonprofit sector,
represent a subset of tax-exempt organizations.30  As a result, the
Internal Revenue Code fully describes them.31  There are twelve
categories of charitable organizations: (a) relief of poverty; (b) ad-
vancement of religion; (c) advancement of education;32 (d) ad-
vancement of science; (e) lessening the burdens of government;
(f) community beautification and maintenance; (g) promotion of
health; (h) promotion of social welfare; (i) promotion of environ-
mental conservancy; (j) promotion of the arts; (k) certain govern-
ment instrumentalities; and (l) maintenance of public confidence
in the legal system.33  Thus, there are at least four categories—(a),
(c), (g), and (h)—that can be described as promoting social
services.
While the twentieth century brought an increased charitable
effort—and private philanthropy continuously expanded in the
United States—due to historical and cultural reasons, its foray into
24 Roscoe Pound, The Spirit of the Common Law, 18 GREEN BAG 17, 24 (1906).
25 FISCH, supra note 12, at 28 (quoting Andrew Carnegie: “The millionaire will be
but a trustee for the poor.”).
26 See BRUCE HOPKINS, CHARITY, ADVOCACY, AND THE LAW 4–5 (1992).
27 For an example of employees directly benefiting, see the story behind the char-
ity Boys Town in BAKAL, supra note 4, at 222–23.
28 See BORIS I. BITTKER, CHARITABLE BEQUESTS AND THE FEDERAL ESTATE TAX: PRO-
POSED RESTRICTIONS ON DEDUCTIBILITY 9–13 (1975) for a historical presentation about
the income tax deduction.
29 FISCH, supra note 12, at 1 (talking about charities “devoted to purposes benefi-
cial to the community”).
30 Id. at 656–57.
31 I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2000).
32 § 170(b)(1)(A)(ii).
33 § 501(c)(3).
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the social services (or human resources) area has consistently been
minuscule.34  Even when faced with—or perhaps because of—a
state effort to offer relief to the poor and unfortunate and to pro-
mote health,35 private giving in the area of social services has his-
torically been no more than 10% of total annual U.S. giving.36
In 1968, for example, private charity amounted to approxi-
mately $15.8 billion,37 and only 7% of that amount was allocated
for human resources.  The largest amount was allocated to the ad-
vancement of religions (46.8%), with hospitals and health receiv-
ing the second-largest amount (17.3%), and education in third
place at 16.7%.38  Twenty years later in 1987, 49% of the total an-
nual funds received by the nonprofit sector went to health services
(primarily hospitals); 21.4% went to education and research;
11.7% went to religion; and 8.9% went to social services.39  Signifi-
cantly, each subsector received more funds from the government
than from private donations.  For example, the health services sub-
sector received $133 billion from the government and $10.5 billion
in private contributions.  Similarly, social services were supported
by $16.1 billion in government payments, but received only $11.3
billion in private contributions.40
Still, if twentieth-century scholars could reason that private giv-
ing for social services was slim because public assistance seemed to
be increasing,41 that reasoning is obviously flawed today.  While the
trend of giving less to the poor continues—and according to Giving
USA, in 2004 only 8% went to human services42—the government
has also denounced its previous functions.  Though the “social
need of governmental and charitable caring for the aged, as well as
the importance and necessity for such a benevolent public policy”43
was clearly recognized in 1968, since then it has been mostly aban-
doned.  Moreover, the poverty rate and the gap between the haves
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 BAKAL, supra note 4, at 225.
37 FISCH, supra note 12, at 31 n.50.
38 Id.
39 VIRGINIA ANN HODGKINSON & MURRAY S. WEITZMAN, DIMENSIONS OF THE INDEPEN-
DENT SECTOR: A STATISTICAL PROFILE 182 (3d ed. 1989).
40 HOPKINS, supra note 26, at 13.
41 E.g., BAKAL, supra note 4, at 225–26.
42 Stephanie Strom, What Is Charity? Nonprofits Are Richer than Ever, but the Share to
the Poor Continues to Dwindle, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2005, at F1.
43 In re Tax Appeal of the United Presbyterian Homes, 236 A.2d 776, 779 (Pa.
1968); see also Strom, supra note 42.
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and the have-nots has steadily increased,44 and we are witnessing an
era when no one wants to support the poor.
The explanation regarding the attitude about giving for
human services is layered in history, demography, and culture, cov-
ering both philosophical beliefs and misperceptions.  Recently, a
journalist surveyed the reasons for the meek donations for the
poor: a lack of empathy by the current middle and upper classes
with the poor; the fact that older women (the largest category of
donors for the poor) are dying out; and mostly the misperception
that the government is taking care of the poor—“Why should a
philanthropist pay if the government will?”45
While Americans are willing to give to charity for temporary
relief for natural catastrophes, such as Hurricane Katrina,46 their
culture is not one to replace state-sponsored social services with
charities.47  Middle-class people are those who historically support
the burden of taxation and the ones who give to charities.  But
while many of them distrust the government, looking more favora-
bly toward NGOs,48 they cannot be too charitable when it comes to
social services for the poor.  How can the educated middle-class,49
who know no poor people, be expected to offer steady and reliable
help to the poor?50  Furthermore, while racial stereotyping is no
longer permissible, bashing the poor occurs with no restraint on
the floor of Congress and other public places.51
44 E. Dana Neaçsu, CLS Stands for Critical Legal Studies, If Anyone Remembers, 8 J.L. &
POL’Y 415, 440–43 (2000).
45 Strom, supra note 42.
46 For example, private donations and pledges are expected to cover the Red
Cross’ estimated cost for its response to hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma, which
amounted to an estimated $2.116 billion as of Feburary 3, 2006. See American Red
Cross – Disaster Relief Fund Campaign Donors Help Red Cross Respond, http://
www.redcross.org/sponsors/drf/FY06_recognition.html.
47 BAKAL, supra note 4, at 17.  For a survey of pubic agencies, unions, and private
charities which constitute the social service structure of the American society, see gen-
erally THE GREENWOOD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN INSTITUTIONS: SOCIAL SERVICE OR-
GANIZATIONS (Peter Romanofsky ed., 1978).
48 Survey Shows Continued Public Mistrust in Governments EURACTIVE (Jan. 27, 2006),
at http://www.euractiv.com/en/governance/survey-shows-continued-public-mistrust-
governments/article-152030.  A global survey confirmed that NGOs are the most
trusted institutions—ahead of businesses, governments, and the media—among col-
lege-educated people between 35 and 64 years of age with a household income over
$75,000. Id.
49 Bernice Lott & Heather E. Bullock, Who Are the Poor?, 57 J. SOC. ISSUES 189, 201
(2001).
50 See generally John L. Hammond, Yuppies, 50 PUB. OPINION Q. 487 (1986); Jo Phe-
lan et al., Education, Social Liberalism, and Economic Conservatism: Attitudes Toward Home-
less People, 60 AM. SOC. REV. 126 (1995).
51 Lott & Bullock, supra note 49, at 201.
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Moreover, the educated America (the middle class) never be-
lieved in Pope John XXIII’s 1963 encyclical letter, “Pacem in Ter-
ris,”52 in which he laid the foundation of a single global
citizenship—which some argued may have implied a right to a
guaranteed social income for all53—based on our sense of charity
and fraternity.54  Americans have been fed liberal individualism
and, as a result, do not seem or cannot afford to believe in the
virtues of a welfare system.  Their understanding about social citi-
zenship does not extend to a guaranteed social income for all.
B. On the Welfare State
The welfare state is generally viewed as being a twentieth-cen-
tury phenomenon.55  It is the result of political class struggle,
which has labor and capital as primary actors.56  It mediates be-
tween politically dominant groups and the politically repressed
ones.
Theoretically, the welfare state is the result of social liberal,
class-based discourse.  Unlike classical liberalism, which thrived on
the disjunction between the individual and his family on one hand
and the broader political community on the other, social liberalism
encouraged “overprotection” by the state.57  The providing “social
liberal” state, whether capitalist or not, has often been defined in
derogative terms either as a “feminized” state58 or as a massive, bu-
reaucratic paternalist state59—and even as the “patriarchal-pater-
52 Pope John XXIII, Encyclical Letter Pacem in Terris (1963), available at http://
www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_xxiii/encyclicals/documents/hf_j-
xxiii_enc_11041963_pacem_en.html.
53 Michael Hardt, Guaranteed Income, or, the Separation of Labor from Income, 5 HYBRID
21, 28 (2000).
54 Pope John XXIII, supra note 52, ¶ 11 (“Man has the right to live.  He has the
right to bodily integrity and to the means necessary for the proper development of
life, particularly food, clothing, shelter, medical care, rest, and, finally, the necessary
social services.  In consequence, he has the right to be looked after in the event of ill
health; disability stemming from his work; widowhood; old age; enforced unemploy-
ment; or whenever through no fault of his own he is deprived of the means of
livelihood.”).
55 See generally ABRAM DE SWAAN, IN CARE OF THE STATE: HEALTH CARE, EDUCATION
AND WELFARE IN EUROPE AND THE USA IN THE MODERN ERA (1988); FRANÇOIS EWALD,
L’ETAT PROVIDENCE (1986).
56 Jill Quadagno, Race, Class, and Gender in the U.S. Welfare State: Nixon’s Failed Family
Assistance Plan, 55 AM. SOC. REV. 11, 26 (1990) [hereinafter Quadagno, Race, Class,
and Gender].
57 Marian Sawer, Gender, Metaphor, and the State, FEMINIST REV., Spring 1996, at 118,
131.
58 For an interesting argument, see generally Sawer, supra note 57.
59 James A. Henretta, Charles Evans Hughes and the Strange Death of Liberal America,
24 LAW & HIST. REV. 115, 115 (2006).
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nalist” “Father State.”60
Today this social liberal state is under attack.  Mocked as the
undesired welfare state—as defined above—it stands in contrast
with the neo-liberal state, whose functions are very similar to those
of the Lassalle’s liberal “night-watchman state.”  The latter’s “func-
tions consist solely in preventing robbery and burglary,”61 as it does
not believe in the state’s ethical duty to provide for its citizens.
In fact, there have been three types of capitalist social liberal
(welfare) states.  Esping-Anderson explained them over a decade
ago.62  One type was personified by the United States, which had
always guaranteed only minimal means-tested benefits.  Another
type is the corporatist welfare state personified by Germany and
France—and adopted in a more minimal version by the European
Union63—where the state’s intervention is meant to alleviate the
capitalist cyclical crisis.  Until recently, the third type was the social
democratic welfare state, which was personified by the Scandina-
vian countries, where substantive economic equality was sought for
all citizens.64
The U.S. federal liberal state was a recent short-lived creation
because aid to the poor remained a local responsibility well into
the twentieth century.  It began with a “big bang”65 reform—the
Social Security Act of 1935 (The New Deal), sponsored by the
Roosevelt Administration66—and arose from the lack of adequate
local support for those hit by the Depression in the 1930s.67  In
1935 alone, the federal government established a comprehensive
array of federal aid and insurance programs, and then “it rested.”68
The federal government did continue to adopt additional pro-
grams for a few decades following the major New Deal legislative
60 Dorothy J. Rosenberg, Shock Therapy: GDR Women in Transition from a Socialist
Welfare State to a Social Market Economy, 17 SIGNS: J. WOMEN CULTURE & SOC’Y 129, 147
(1991).
61 FERDINAND LASSALLE, Das Arbeiterprogramm, in 2 GESAMMELTE REDEN UND
SCHRIFTEN 195–96 (Eduard Bernstein ed., 1919).
62 See generally GøSTA ESPING-ANDERSEN, THE THREE WORLDS OF WELFARE CAPITAL-
ISM (1990).
63 Gráinne de Búrca, Towards European Welfare?, in EU LAW AND THE WELFARE
STATE: IN SEARCH OF SOLIDARITY 1–10 (Gráinne de Búrca ed., 2005).
64 ESPING-ANDERSEN, supra note 62, at 48–49.
65 CHRISTOPHER LEMAN, THE COLLAPSE OF WELFARE REFORM: POLITICAL INSTITU-
TIONS, POLICY, AND THE POOR IN CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES 23 (1980).
66 WILLIAM E. FORBATH, THE LONG LIFE OF LIBERAL AMERICA: LAW AND STATE-BUILD-
ING IN THE U.S. AND U.K. 1–3 (2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstact=738564.
67 LEMAN, supra note 65, at 26.
68 Id. at 23.
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reforms—including the Social Security Act of 193569 and its Aid to
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC)70 and the National La-
bor Relations Act of 1935—but it never knew the “steady state” of
continual growth of the Canadian welfare state, for instance.71
The U.S. welfare state was very much shaped in its formative
decades.  For example, until its replacement, AFDC excluded
childless families and many working families.72  There were some
innovative changes like the War on Poverty programs, which tried
to create an “equal opportunity” welfare state and thus alleviate the
legacy of racial division left by the New Deal benefits.73  These pro-
grams never quite became an integral part of American political
institutions.  They were always a point of contention between the
predominant corrective justice and the less-popular distributive jus-
tice approaches to government.  Additionally, few of the New Deal
programs were considered successes with the exception of the
Food Stamp program, which answered the widespread hunger real-
ities of the day as the number of beneficiaries grew from 2 million
to almost 18 million from 1968 to 1979.74
The U.S. welfare state was the result of a well-contained social
liberal belief in the duty of the state to provide for individuals in
need.  While it has always had a double nature—being a “public-
private welfare state,”75 unlike European welfare which is a matter
of state duty, for example76—even in this unique character, it did
not survive for too long.
Prior to 1980, every administration following Roosevelt’s “stat-
ist” and “bureaucratic” measures77 dabbled in welfare policies.  The
Johnson-era “War on Poverty” was the most successful of these ini-
tiatives, though President Carter’s welfare legislation focused on a
69 Pub. L. No. 74-271, Aug. 14, 1935, 49 Stat. 620 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 301–1397 (2000)).
70 AFDC was U.S. federal social welfare legislation designed to work with similar
state programs to provide financial support for dependent children living with rela-
tives.  It was authorized under Title IV of the Social Security Act of 1935. See Stephen
D. Sugarman, Reforming Welfare Through Social Security, 26 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 817,
823–24 (1993).
71 LEMAN, supra note 65, at 23.
72 Id. at 200.
73 See JILL QUADAGNO, THE COLOR OF WELFARE: HOW RACISM UNDERMINED THE WAR
ON POVERTY 185–97 (1994) [hereinafter QUADAGNO, THE COLOR OF WELFARE].
74 LEMAN, supra note 65, at 202.
75 See Sonya Michel, A Tale of Two States: Race, Gender, and Public/Private Welfare
Provision in Postwar America, 9 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 123 (1997) (describing employer-
sponsored fringe benefits and government welfare programs).
76 de Búrca, supra note 63, at 5.
77 FORBATH, supra note 66, at 3.
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nationally administered system of guarantees.78  Even Republican
administrations tried to improve the process—President Nixon es-
tablished the Family Assistance Plan,79 which allocated $1,600 per
year for a family of four80—at least until the Republican Reagan
Administration.  The Reagan Administration and, following that,
the Democratic Clinton Administration, both did their best to end
the paternalist social liberal state, which, with all its faults, did pro-
vide services to the poor.  To the extent that the pre-1980s welfare
policies passed Congressional and judicial review, all helped pro-
mote economic development of low-income communities81 by ad-
dressing the provision of basic needs such as housing, education,
food, and access to health care through the Medicaid program.82
Those services were not the best—or even adequate—by many
standards.  Their very own nature made them vulnerable.  For ex-
ample, they covered both social insurance programs and social as-
sistance benefits.  The first ones were supposed to be granted as
civil rights earned through work participation.  But as Jill
Quadagno observed, while social insurance programs merely repli-
cated the market inequalities due to their contingency on employ-
ment (means-test), social assistance benefits had both a means-test
(“a labor control factor”) and a family-status requirement.83  Be-
cause of their attachment to family status (i.e., a child caretaker is
eligible because she is unable to work or without a man who can
provide support), they offered no guarantee of future income, and
when that enabling status changed, those benefits stopped.84  Con-
sequently, both the left and right criticized the pre-1980s welfare
policies.  The right argued that they were anti-American85 because
they were the result of raw class-based power politics and repre-
sented a form of centralized “redistributive class politics.”86  The
78 Id. at 94.
79 LEMAN, supra note 65, at 70–71, 78.
80 Id.
81 See Hope Lewis, Women (Under)Development: The Relevance of “The Right to Develop-
ment” to Poor Women of Color in the United States, 18 LAW & POL’Y 281, 282–93 (1996).
82 Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 301 (1980) (“The Medicaid program was created
in 1965, when Congress added Title XIX to the Social Security Act for the purpose of
providing federal assistance to States that choose to reimburse certain costs of medi-
cal treatment for needy persons.”).
83 Quadagno, Race, Class, and Gender, supra note 56, at 14.
84 Id.
85 See, e.g., LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN, AMERICAN LAW IN THE 20TH CENTURY 187 (2002).
In 1949, rent control was criticized as “un–American,” “against God and the Bible,” as
making “slaves out of owners,” and giving tenants more money to “buy whiskey, to
gamble, and to throw to the wind.” Id.
86 FORBATH, supra note 66, at 3.
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left criticized the pre-1980s welfare policies as stigmatizing and hu-
miliating, coercing women into taking menial jobs and providing
benefits that were below the poverty line.87
Surprisingly, by the end of the Carter Administration the wel-
fare discourse had become apocalyptic, using the biblical mythol-
ogy of “after the collapse.”88  Shortly thereafter, the Reagan
Administration ushered in the beginning of the end when “[i]n
1981, deep cuts in federal aid to states and localities reduced fund-
ing to 1968 levels.”89  By the 1990s, welfare opponents were able to
mount a successful conservative critique that blamed public assis-
tance for both creating and sustaining poverty.90  In fact, the early
1990s reignited the “smoldering political obsession”91 with both
the welfare system and “the myth of the welfare mother with a Cad-
illac.”92  Its prevalence was so pervasive that Democratic President
Clinton became a mere pawn in the destruction of the welfare sys-
tem.  He chose to keep his campaign promise and “end welfare as
we know it,” signing into law the Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act  (Personal Responsibility Act) in
1996.93  However, Clinton’s reforms have only worsened the plight
of those they were intended to help.
The Personal Responsibility Act includes inter alia a mandatory
work requirement after two years of receiving aid,94 as well as a five-
year lifetime limit per family.95  Additionally, it provides for reduc-
tions of the Food Stamp program and other structural cuts.96
Overall, public funding was cut by $54 billion within the first six
years of the program.97  Nevertheless, empirical data did not reveal
a corresponding reduction of poverty.  To the contrary, while the
War on Poverty reduced the nation’s poverty rate from 18% to 9%
87 QUADAGNO, THE COLOR OF WELFARE, supra note 73, at 117.
88 LEMAN, supra note 65, at 198–227.
89 QUADAGNO, THE COLOR OF WELFARE, supra note 73, at 178.
90 Ann R. Tickamyer, Public Policy and Private Lives: Social and Spatial Dimensions of
Women’s Poverty and Welfare Policy in the United States, 84 KY. L.J. 721, 725–29
(1995–1996).
91 Elaine McCrate & Joan Smith, When Work Doesn’t Work: The Failure of Current
Welfare Reform, 12 GENDER & SOC’Y 61, 61 (1998).
92 Thomas Ross, The Rhetoric of Poverty: Their Immorality, Our Helplessness, 79 GEO.
L.J. 1499, 1507 (1991).
93 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (2000) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.).
94 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(1)(A)(ii) (2000).
95 Id. § 608(a)(7).
96 McCrate & Smith, supra note 91, at 61.
97 Id.
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in 1972,98 current data demonstrates that poor people are worse
off since the passage of the Personal Responsibility Act.99
Primary in the 1996 welfare reform was the Charitable Choice
provision,100 which authorized faith-based organizations to com-
pete with secular organizations to provide federally funded welfare,
health, and social services.101  This provision, which President
George W. Bush has embraced,102 allows faith-based organizations
to retain their religious character while providing social services, so
long as recipients’ religious freedom is not diminished.103  It is al-
ready difficult to understand why government would cut short its
direct public assistance programs, choosing instead to subsidize re-
ligious organizations’ social activities.  It is even more difficult to
understand if one remembers that the amount of funding allo-
cated for this complicated scheme has always been inadequate for
any systemic cure of poverty104 and encompasses less funding than
was previously expended for social services.105
While the nation’s welfare caseload dropped from 7.2 million
in 1993 to 6.9 million in 1999, poverty has not only continued but
increased106 as people received less assistance.107  Thus, it can be
98 QUADAGNO, THE COLOR OF WELFARE, supra note 73, at 175.
99 Lott & Bullock, supra note 49, at 194.
100 § 604a.
101 Judith B. Goodman, Charitable Choice: The Ramifications of Government Funding for
Faith-Based Health Care Services, 26 NOVA L. REV. 563, 563 (2002).
102 Andrea Pallios, Should We Have Faith in the Faith-Based Initiative?: A Constitutional
Analysis of President Bush’s Charitable Choice Plan, 30 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 131, 132
(2002).
103 § 604a(b).
104 See Vanessa Gallman, Kids Emerge As Focus of Welfare Debate, SAN JOSE MERCURY
NEWS, July 30, 1996, at A9.  On the other hand, though Bush’s fund for Charitable
Choice would mix federal money and private giving, it was never expected to be more
than $1.8 billion over ten years. Marc Lacey with Laurie Goodstein, Bush Fleshes Out
Details of Proposal to Expand Aid to Religious Organizations, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2001, at
A15.  Additionally within the Charitable Choice scheme, the government must pro-
vide a secular alternative to any such services. Id.  For a further discussion on the
impact of welfare reform on child abuse, see Nancy A. Wright, Welfare Reform Under the
Personal Responsibility Act: Ending Welfare as We Know It or Governmental Child Abuse?, 25
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 357 (1998).
105 The Personal Responsibility Act was passed because it promised to save as much
as $61 billion over six years by cutting back money available for various welfare pro-
grams. See Wright, supra note 104, at 359 n.10.
106 David Leonhardt, Poverty in U.S. Grew in 2004, While Income Failed to Rise for 5th
Straight Year, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 2005, at A9. Nationally, the poverty rate in 2004
increased to 12.7% from 12.5% in 2003; in New York, it rose to 20.3% in 2004 from
19% in 2003. Id.  “Poverty levels have changed only modestly in the last three de-
cades, rising in the 1980’s and falling in the 1990’s, after having dropped sharply in
the 1960’s.” Id.  Rates decreased from more than 22% in 1960 to a low of 11.1% in
1973. Id.
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said that the Personal Responsibility Act effectively destroyed one
of the pillars of the American social liberal state.  In 1999, 11.8%,
or 32.3 million people, lived in poverty—with the majority of those
families living well below the poverty line108—in 2004, the official
poverty rate had steadily grown to 12.7%, or 37 million people.109
In 1999, the federal poverty threshold for a family of four was
$17,184.110  Despite inflation rates, the federal poverty threshold
was only $19,307 in 2004111—and these numbers cover only part of
our poor.  They do not include the working class that cannot af-
ford health care, proper housing, or education—that would add
tens of million of people to our count.112  This very schematic pic-
ture depicts a systemic problem that affects our entire society:
whether to accept that the poor are part of it or to segregate them.
Can private charity help manage, contain, or solve this problem?
This question, however, poses difficulties.  First, charity, even
when it provides social services, is not meant to resolve structural
social problems—it assists individuals.113  Second, even if poverty
results from a lack of personal responsibility, charity is not the an-
swer because inadequate individualized services or minimal cash
distributions are not enough to make a meaningful difference.
Personal economic success is not simply the consequence of iso-
lated decisions.114  Data show that personal decisions are shaped by
an individual’s physical and social contexts.115  A person’s physical
characteristics, including gender, age, race, and ethnicity, in addi-
tion to his or her access to resources, such as education and health
care, are major factors in the equation of personal economic suc-
cess.116  In fact, the availability of resources such as money, educa-
tion, and social support vitally affects the degree of personal
agency and responsibility.  Poverty limits options, which, in turn,
undermines agency and personal responsibility.  The failure of the
previous welfare system confirms the taxing nature of inadequate
107 Lott & Bullock, supra note 49, at 195.
108 Id. at 192.
109 CARMEN DENAVAS WALT ET AL., INCOME, POVERTY, AND HEALTH INSURANCE COV-
ERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2004, at 9 (2005), http://www.census.gov/prod/
2005pubs/p60-229.pdf.
110 Lott & Bullock, supra note 49, at 192.
111 DENAVAS WALT ET AL., supra note 109, at 45.
112 Lott & Bullock, supra note 49, at 195–96.
113 BAKAL, supra note 4, at 222–51.
114 Jacquelin W. Scarborough, Welfare Mothers’ Reflections on Personal Responsibility, 57
J. SOC. ISSUES 261, 262 (2001).
115 Id.
116 Id.
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resources.  Significantly, data surveying single mothers on welfare
attending college showed that their best survival choice was to rely
on public assistance, albeit minimal, during that time because it
provided benefits such as health care, food stamps, and rent subsi-
dies.117  None of the surveyed single mothers, however, considered
private charity and its unknown benefits.118
The defunct welfare system might have stigmatized its recipi-
ents, but because its employees had more expertise and efficiency
than those of private charities focused on social services—such as
Boys Town, the Boy Scouts, and the Girl Scouts119—it also helped
out many more millions of Americans.  Destroying the national
welfare system and outsourcing it to the private sector—depriving
families of a quasi-reliable financial support—is not and cannot be
the answer to our systemic poverty problem.
C. On the Neo-Liberal State and Distributive and Corrective Justice
The reality is that private charity cannot replace public assis-
tance, and, as shown above, charity does not intend to do that.  In
fact, as discussed here, we have witnessed a decrease in private
charity aimed at social services.  The only real problem is that the
state has decided to renege on its natural commitments, such a
providing for its poor, even though being poor is often the result
of state job and welfare policies.
Any society can tolerate public services and fund them
through taxes if it believes that the community has to take care of
its needy members.  The moment it starts questioning that duty
and regards its poor as “undeserving,” Thomas Ross reminds us,
society will stop funding services for the disadvantaged.  Once the
label of undeserving poor creeps into popular belief, it becomes
very difficult to perceive poverty accurately, as originating in “the
structure of America’s political economy”120—not in the behavior
of the poor, who are often described as deviant, criminal, and “be-
yond hope and [without] any sense of initiative.”121
These cultural assumptions inform and are reflected in legisla-
tion, such as the 1996 Personal Responsibility Act,122 as well as in
judicial opinions.  The U.S. Supreme Court has previously dis-
117 Id. at 262–72.
118 Id.
119 BAKAL, supra note 4, at 222–51.
120 Ross, supra note 92, at 1508.
121 Id. at 1507.
122 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996).
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played a lack of empathy for the poor, acknowledging only the
“narrowest constitutional grounds for addressing their interests.”123
For example, in a 1970 decision, Dandridge v. Williams,124 the Court
held that an absolute limit of $250 per month for a public assis-
tance grant, regardless of the size of the family and its actual need,
did not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.125  There are countless other decisions like Dandridge,
all of which display the Justices’ belief in corrective justice.126
One such example is Bowen v. Gilliard,127 in which the Su-
preme Court considered the constitutionality of an adjustment in
the distribution of welfare (AFDC) benefits in an impoverished
American household.  The Court concluded that a governmental
decision to reduce a family’s welfare benefits, in light of the sup-
port a member of the family received from his non-custodial par-
ent, did not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, nor the Due Process or Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment.128  In other words, the governmental decision did not
need any corrective action by the judiciary.
Moreover, the Court was able to look at the government’s ac-
tions as an insulated act, which could be judged outside its larger
implications (though in this case the implications were limited to a
family setting).  For instance, in upholding the policy under the
Takings Clause, Justice Stevens refused to consider the financial
impact of the policy on the family as a whole, instead considering
only the impact on the child.129  Instead, the Court chose to con-
sider the policy’s financial impact on the child alone, as if the child
had no mother or siblings.  Additionally, Justice Stevens stated that
a child has no vested interest in receiving the same level of child
support payments, as if the Justice had never heard of a reliance
argument.  Despite the Court’s rationale, its holding penalized the
child and his family because their financial resources were de facto
reduced.130
123 Ross, supra note 92, at 1509.
124 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
125 Id. at 486.  Now can we blame the Justices for not counting members of the
underclass among their acquaintances?
126 Corrective justice argues that it is not a matter of fairness and justice to take care
of the poor (the poor are mostly undeserving anyway), because it is not an appropri-
ate role of the state to do so.  The state can and should enable justice, but only when a
wrong is involved.
127 483 U.S. 587 (1987).
128 Id. at 597.
129 Id. at 606–07.
130 Id. at 605.
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Justice Brennan, writing in the dissent, was more sensitive to
the impact of the policy on both the child and his family.  In Justice
Brennan’s view, the Court’s decision condoned the government
telling a “child who lives with a mother receiving public assistance
that it cannot both live with its mother and be supported by its
father.  The child must either leave the care and custody of the
mother, or forgo the support of the father and become a Govern-
ment client.”131  Stated another way, while every other child has a
right to rely on the support of a non-custodial parent, a child living
with a parent who receives public assistance cannot.  Even worse,
the majority failed to recognize that, under the policy it upheld, a
“child must choose between the father and mother solely because
other household members are indigent and desire public assis-
tance,” and it is the “presence of these persons in the household,
not the child’s voluntary application for public assistance, that trig-
gers the requirement that it choose which parental relationship to
maintain.”132
So much depends on the way one chooses to judge an act,
individually or within the socio-economic context of that member’s
class.133  But such choice is not readily available.  Taking a contex-
tual view would require a distributive approach to justice.  Such an
approach is not only very expensive, but also not clearly demanded
by any oppositional (radical) movement as we will see in the next
Section of the Article.  So, if no one pushes for it, why bother?
Under the prevalent conservative view, in the neo-liberal state,
the poor are poor because of their behavior—not because of any
structural problems with the economic system.  To the extent that
poverty is thus perceived as an individual behavioral problem and
not a structural one—which would imply a wrong done to the poor
on a larger social scale—the state, especially the emaciated mascu-
line state, has no duty to interfere.  Instead, its relegated role is that
of a night watchman.134  All it can do is correct private wrongs and
protect individuals from those private wrongs.
This discourse is not new.  Its roots are in the Aristotelian dis-
course of justice, which analyzed both corrective and distributive
justice.135  Interestingly, the Aristotelian treatment of distributive
justice specified what needed to be equally shared in society—
131 Id. at 610 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
132 Id. at 625.
133 See A.W. Phinney III, Feminism, Epistemology, and the Rhetoric of Law: Reading
Bowen v. Gilliard, 12 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 151, 158–59, 166 (1989).
134 See LASSALLE, supra note 61.
135 ARISTOTLE, NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS 118–20 (Martin Ostwald trans., 1962).
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those goods that determined one’s good or bad fortune, such as
money—because those goods,136 Aristotle believed, were in limited
supply.137  In other words, we cannot all be filthy rich, but we can
and should all enjoy decent living.
The culture that once embraced social democracy is under as-
sault everywhere, including Western Europe.  The United States, in
particular, is leading the way with its emaciated neo-liberal state.
Optimistically, William Forbath argues American liberalism may
not be dead.138  Despite the world’s policymakers longing for the
American market, which is unencumbered by “government-en-
forced social and economic rights,”139 the Europeans, unlike us,
are not yet prepared to relinquish the social dimension of citizen-
ship guarantees140 (with a minimum of economic welfare and se-
curity).  Therefore, perhaps, we in America need to refocus our
critical analysis and address the problems public assistance faces
today, reinvigorating the public debate about what type of dis-
course could promote much-needed public assistance.
II. ON RADICALISM AND POSTMODERN THOUGHT
This Section grew out of the observation that, while the wel-
fare state is shrinking, we are witnessing members of the social
groups most affected by this nefarious situation becoming more
and more visible in the public and private sectors, including the
nonprofit sector.  This Section presumes that this visibility is closely
connected to various academic and non-academic movements
which promoted social (tribal) diversity, both in the public and pri-
vate sphere, and which pressured legislators and judges to make
necessary changes in our laws.  Moreover, this Section assumes that
the limit of their visibility—which improved their individual lives
but not necessarily those with whom they identify biologically (or
tribally)—is also directly connected to the values those movements
promote.
Among the poor, non-white minorities and women, especially
single mothers and the elderly, are most vulnerable.141  Thus, it was
136 These goods should not be confused with “public goods,” such as cleaner air or
indigenous knowledge.  For more on the “public goods” discourse, see Peter Drahos,
The Regulation of Public Goods, 7 J. INT’L ECON. L. 321 (2004).
137 William Mathie, Political and Distributive Justice in the Political Science of Aristotle, 49
REV. POL. 59, 64–66 (1987).
138 FORBATH, supra note 66, at 3.
139 Id.
140 Id.
141 Lott & Bullock, supra note 49, at 192; Joy K. Rice, Poverty, Welfare, and Patriarchy:
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only expected that they were also the first to be affected by the
welfare reform policies of 1996.  For example, in 1999, 74% of
newly-created jobs in the areas with the most growth paid less than
a livable wage, and 46% paid less than half a livable wage.142  Out
of these jobs, those most often available to mothers leaving welfare
for work were “maid, cashier or waitress” and other such service
industry jobs, which often did not pay the minimum wage or pro-
vide benefits.143
During this period, we also witnessed the rise to prominence
of members of these destitute-prone groups.  More and more wo-
men are politically successful: Carol Moseley Braun, Hillary Clin-
ton, Condoleezza Rice, and Elizabeth Dole are among the most
politically engaged.  Overall, women—whether white or non-
white—are increasingly represented in the judicial, legislative, and
executive branches of government, as well as in the corporate144
and nonprofit world.145
Nevertheless, their personal success stories have not caused a
systemic change, or even a slow-down, in the demise of the social
liberal state.  During the better days of the welfare state—when
“the percentage of black 18- to 24-year-olds enrolled in college
grew from 13% in 1965 to 22.6% by 1975,”146 and the number of
college-educated African-Americans “holding white-collar jobs in-
creased by 522 percent”147—the quality of life for the poor African-
Americans, especially African-American women, declined “on
nearly every indicator.”148  For example, the number of children
born out of wedlock, which is one indicator of poverty, doubled to
62.6% in less than two decades, from the early 1970s to the late
How Macro-Level Changes in Social Policy Can Help Low-Income Women, 57 J. SOC. ISSUES
355, 355 (2001).
142 Lott & Bullock, supra note 49, at 195.
143 Id.
144 In 2002, women held 2140 of the 13,673 corporate officer positions in the For-
tune 500—twice as many as in 1995. See CATALYST, WOMEN IN THE FORTUNE 500, at 2,
http://www.catalystwomen.org/pressroom/press_releases/2-10-05%20Cata-
lyst%20Female%20CEOs%20Fact%20Sheet.pdf (last visited Mar. 23, 2006).
145 For example, within the last decade, all the presidents of the Red Cross have
been women. See The American Red Cross, Presidents, Chairmen and Chief Execu-
tive Officers, http://www.redcross.org/museum/president.pdf (last visited Mar. 29,
2006).  An increasing number of faculty members across the nation’s campuses are
women.  For example, there has been a 10% increase in female faculty at Yale Univer-
sity. See Yale University Office of the Provost, An Initiative to Enhance Faculty Diver-
sity within the Faculty of Arts and Science, http://www.yale.edu/provost/html/
provost_ltr_diversity.html.
146 QUADAGNO, THE COLOR OF WELFARE, supra note 73, at 176.
147 Id.
148 Id.
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1980s.149  In a society that does not offer adequate public assistance
for child care150 and whose working class is dominated by women
employed in service jobs receiving lower wages than men in manu-
facturing jobs, an increased number of children born out of wed-
lock, coupled with declining wages, is a major reason for the
shrinking of the middle class and the soaring number of individu-
als who fall into poverty.151
While apparently paradoxical, this Article suggests that this
phenomenon is the natural result of a lack of classical radical dis-
course that could successfully oppose the current corporate-driven
political environment.  Such discourse would be class-based, but
none of the dominant postmodern schools of thoughts is inter-
ested in this approach.152
Increased reliance on private charities for social services,
which is possible because the volume of these services is continually
shrinking, might be connected to a lack of oppositional critical dis-
course—a discourse that believes in general solutions to systemic
problems and could pressure the incumbent ideology to promote
much-needed changes.  The radical discourse of the day has aban-
doned community socio-economic values for a postmodern and
post-material ideal of individual achievement that often exalts tri-
bal non-economic features at the expense of those who require ec-
onomic support, such as education, good health, and decent
housing.  Postmodern radicalism promotes individual success and
ignores the destitute masses, under the pretext that it cannot speak
on their behalf.  For example, postmodern feminism encourages a
cacophony of individualistic ideologies that often banish any refer-
ence to historical social context, as if individuals can develop some-
how outside the society in which they want to flourish and
sometimes govern and control.
Gary Minda puts both feminism and critical race theories into
the context of the current postmodern jurisprudential discourse.
He explains how postmodern jurisprudence—schools of thought
focused on understanding the law and the adjudicatory pro-
cess153—represents a rejection of the New Deal philosophy and its
149 Id.
150 See generally Martha Fineman, The Nature of Dependencies and Welfare “Reform,” 36
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 287 (1995–1996).
151 QUADAGNO, THE COLOR OF WELFARE, supra note 73, at 180.
152 See generally Neaçsu, The Wrongful Rejection, supra note 9.
153 The five jurisprudential movements that reflect the postmodern sensibilities are
feminism, critical race theory, critical legal studies, law and literature, and law and
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meta-narrative.154  While the postmodern skeptical attitude is a wel-
come addition to any school of thought, however, a limited, even
castrated agenda that discredits the need for systemic solutions is
far from radical or subversive.  To the contrary, its very attraction,
its moodiness, its ennui,155 its theoretical impotence makes it easily
defeatable.  Postmodernism is not an attack on the very existence
of mainstream jurisprudence.  Postmodernism is derivative work.
It is a variation on the same theme.  As a result, co-opting it has
been the successful strategy of the hegemonic discourse.156
Although feminism aims to eliminate gender subordina-
tion,157 it avoids a meta-narrative structural approach to the causes
of gender subordination.  Instead, feminism seems to be satisfied
with patching-up solutions that rest on diversifying the shrinking
number of the haves158 or the illusory rights the Supreme Court
recognizes one day only to deny or limit the following day.159  It is
very troubling that some feminists confidently reject efforts to col-
lapse discourse into some essential demand, such as income distri-
bution.160  While fairness, justice, and equity require more than
income distribution, without a decent income that enables ade-
quate access to market goods—such as education, housing, and
health care—we cannot meaningfully talk about fairness, justice, or
equity.  While the diverse values individuals hold deserve respect,
economics. GARY MINDA, POSTMODERN LEGAL MOVEMENTS: LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE AT
CENTURY’S END, 83–105, 224–46 (1995).
154 Id. at 224.
155 Id. at 233.
156 For a more detailed analysis of this argument, see generally Neaçsu, The Wrong-
ful Rejection, supra note 9.
157 MINDA, supra note 153, at 228.
158 If feminism wants more women in the workplace, for example, but the market
does not allow everybody to be employed (or even worse, it reduces the number of
jobs), then women end up replacing (for lower pay) men in the work force.  A similar
process happens with outsourcing non-professional government jobs to the private
sector for lower wages.  In this instance, women usually hold both types of jobs; the
only difference is in pay: Once outsourced to the private sector, the job comes with
less earnings, as other panelists, such as Jeanne Mullgrav, Commisioner of the New
York City Department of Youth and Community Development, highlighted during
the post-panel discussion at the New York City Law Review Symposium.  This effect is
not limited to the United States. See, e.g., Charlotte Denny, Professionals’ Pay Packets
Fail to Keep Pace: Waves of Privatisation Have Led to Big Changes, GUARDIAN (London),
Mar. 21, 2001, at 3, available at http://society.guardian.co.uk/commongood/com-
ment/0,,460102,00.html.
159 Dana Neaçsu, Tempest in a Teacup or the Mystique of Sexual Legal Discourse, 38
GONZ. L. REV. 601, 617–25 (2002–2003).
160 See generally Gillian K. Hadfield, Feminism, Fairness and Welfare: An Invitation to
Feminist Law and Economics 1 ANN. REV. L. &  SOC. SCI. 285 (2005).
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poverty causes a pain in the stomach that only food can soothe.161
Moreover, when 57% of the poor are women and 70% of
working women earn less than $20,000 yearly, what we need is a
distributive public policy program which addresses the systemic
cause of poverty.162  And that cause is first a quantifiable, socio-
economic one; even poverty of knowledge and obscurantism are
economic in nature.
III. RETHINKING OUR PUBLIC ASSISTANCE
This brief Section highlights the democratic need of providing
a decent level of social services for all.  If democracy requires active
citizenship, then it cannot afford hungry, destitute, and hopeless
people whose sole public activity may be limited to engaging in
crime to survive.  Ignoring poverty will only increase the number of
have-nots, and we cannot put them all in jail (although we are cer-
tainly trying our best!).  The longer we wait, the costlier a price we
will pay as a society.  The need to remake our public assistance pro-
grams is imminent.  Today we have the luxury to think about how
to improve them—tomorrow we may not.
Public assistance for the most disadvantaged groups, such as
mothers and children, would definitely require a welfare theorem
which emphasizes the role of quality, caring labor.  The immediate
public implication of such a reform is obvious.  As Gillian K. Had-
field recently noted:  “Caring labor has significant public good at-
tributes, particularly if we emphasize the relationship between
quality care of children and the production of social capital in the
form of norms of honesty, trust, civic engagement, reciprocity, re-
spect for law, and so on.”163  NGOs, such as charities, have never
been meant to solve such systemic problems.  They are part of civic
society—the part of society that can provide constructive criticism
to governments.
Of course, the previous solution, providing single mothers
with cash to take care of their children, was not ideal.  Perhaps it
was only slightly better than the one used today: herding and bus-
ing mothers to under-paid jobs while unqualified people take care
of their children.164  A decade ago, Martha Fineman suggested that
161 For a more vivid description of this phenomenon, see Nobel Prize laureate Knut
Hamsun’s story about a young writer on his own, unable to find work, starving, and
homeless in Christiania. KNUT HAMSUN, HUNGER (Robert Bly trans., Farrar, Straus &
Giroux 1967) (1890).
162 Rice, supra note 141, at 355.
163 Hadfield, supra note 160, at 293.
164 Sharon Lerner, Op-Ed., Working Hard and Losing Out, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2005,
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the United States should look at how other industrialized countries
have dealt with this issue and develop its own policies based on
European ones.165  Joy K. Rice, too, argued in support of macro-
level reforms that would alleviate women’s poverty, focusing on
equal pay for equal work, one year of postsecondary education,
universal health insurance, and preventive health services.166
Those solutions seem more compelling today than ever.
Only a policy based on justice that is twofold—distributive
and, to the extent necessary, corrective—could be successful.
There is no fault or wrong-doing behavior that causes poverty.  Pov-
erty exists because the system cannot provide jobs for all.  Under
these circumstances, to pretend that charities can take care of the
destitute is not only disingenuous, it is callous and dangerous.  It is
dangerous because poverty can breed subclasses not unlike the Ro-
man proletariat, which was indeed easily silenced with bread and
circuses but equally useless for any purpose other than manipu-
lated election results.  I doubt that we are looking to the last days of
the Roman Empire as our democratic model.
CONCLUSION
This Author views the emaciation of the neo-liberal state as a
democratic mistake.  Democracy requires active citizenship, yet the
ignored, the hungry, and the abused cannot become involved citi-
zens.  Furthermore, gender- and race-neutral policy requires “redis-
tribution of status and social power,”167 and its enactment depends
on the disenfranchised, such as women and African Americans, be-
coming actors, not policy objects, in the political process.
Private charities cannot deal with such a systemic problem.
Thus, if democracy is a value we treasure, we need to reassess our
current public assistance policies and accept redistributive justice.
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